The Exploration of Paradox and Chance of International Cooperation under Global Environmental Governance

Abstract

The Industrial Revolution has unveiled the development of global capitalism. States, corporations and individuals are accumulating capital for desire. While consuming resource on earth, it is confirmed by IPCC in the 4th evaluation report that human activities are the main reason for global warming. In the past decades, global warming has become the main important issue in international society. It reflects that the globe is undertaking a revolution, which takes low-carbon development as the core under the challenge climate risk and the security of resource. The states are confronting the decision paradox of the state's individual interest and the global public interest. Despite the fact that the state plays the main role in international anarchy society, it is obstructed by the lack of supra-nation organization to force the states to obey international regime. Therefore, it is difficult to solve the problem of collective action problem, free rider problem and dilemma of common aversions…etc. Those things will influence the result of environmental regime. The state or non-state actor reaches good outcome with systematic collaboration or cooperation. However, the governance trend of international systematic collaboration has usually ignored or weakened the aspect of power. During the process of global environmental governance, power may represent in multiple or sequent operational ways, or jump out of the role, which take nation as the main and traditional role to exercise power. Because the regime has compulsory problem, deviation, privilege of regime and unfair confined actions, studying multiple aspects of power operation during governance could help us understand the paradox of international cooperation in order to explore the chance of international cooperation.