Cebu's Subnational Politics: A Survey of Philippine Political Structure and Culture

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Abstract -- **The paper is a survey of the Filipino Nation's effort towards nation building. It highlights the socio-historical unfolding of the nationhood of the country -- Philippines. The paper answers the basic question on what paved the way to the formation of the Filipino Nation and why it remains to be a neo-colonial outpost to the US even in the 20th century. It also provides reasons on how and why Filipinos had shaped the kind of institutions that operate the present state as it is now.**

Using Comparative Historical Analysis (CHA), the paper elaborately accounts on what turning points served as the watersheds of nationhood to Philippine political history. Likewise it employs historical institutionalism as well as the new institutional economics. It emphasizes on property rights, transaction costs, modes of governance, social norms, ideological values, enforcement mechanisms, and others that paved way to what Philippine politics and governance came to be as it is historically traced to its present formation.

The study engages scenarios on what it had been in the past and what it might be in the years to come given the path that it has tread from colonial times to to its neo-colonial position at present.

Keywords- Philippine political structure and culture; Subnational Politics; Filipino Nationhood; Formation of the Filipino Nation; Philippine Developmentalism

I. Studies on Politics in Cebu

Extensive scholarly work has been done on Cebuano politics. These include the well-known edited volume *An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines* by Alfred McCoy. The volume presents key sources on the dynamics of traditional political families, such as chapters by Michael Cullinane, "Patron as Client: Warlord Politics and the Duranos of Danao" (in McCoy 1998:163-243), and by Resil Mojares, "The Dream Goes On: Three Generations of the Osmeñas" (1998:311-347). These works explored specific cases that show the historical development of political structure and culture operating in Cebuano local politics and the role of political families.

More discussions on Cebuano political dynamics can be found in the works of John Sidel in *Capital, Coercion and Crime Bossism in the Philippines* (1999), of Michael Cullinane in *"The Changing Nature of the Cebu Urban Elite* (1982)," of Alfred McCoy and Ed de Jesus in *Philippine Social History: Local Trade and Global Transformations* (1982), and of Concepcion Briones in *Life in Old Parian* (1983).

Literature shows that Cebu province's local political history consists of structural layers of supra-local or supra-municipal organizations of patron-client relations, of machine politics, and of bossism. Prominent political leaders derive popular support from leaders of major townships, cities, and barangays who can promise and deliver to the patron the bulk of voters to ensure victory. This means that leaders who represent major political clans get support through a network of small town bosses that govern urban and rural communities.

Sidel's work (1999) *Capital, Coercion, and Crime Bossism in the Philippines* demonstrates the distinctive organization of Cebuano political settlement through web-like connections of small town, district, and provincial political organizations. It shows the interplay of political clans and political dynasties at the district, town, and provincial levels. This arrangement also shows political compromise among elites as mechanism for them to accumulate proprietary wealth; where inter-familial, economic, and political competition has taken on a more paternalistic and less violent exchange and indicates how politicians rely on the skillful use of state offices and the construction of a political machine (Sidel 1999).

Cebu as an island local government unit is a dominant player in economic trade among island provinces and LGUs in the Visayan region. Cebu's economic development can be traced to its history of class formation and land settlement that enabled its transformation from agricultural entrepot, an intermediary center of trade and trans-shipment, into a regional center of export industries at the turn of the 20th century (Sidel 1999:81,128; McCoy 1998:7; Cullinane 1982:273).

The dominant business and political clans, rich families or personalities of Cebu's rural townships sustained themselves in power since the 1940s as they are mostly scions of pre-war local landlords and politicians. Sidel's (1999) work also accounts for institutions of multi-tiered networks of small town bosses in cohorts with district patrons who collaborate with provincial patrons, who in turn also commit to national patrons.

Furthermore, in Cebu City, the political and economic dynamics sustained electoral competition and capital accumulation of a network of Chinese mestizos who settled in the heart of the City such as the Parian District (Briones 1983). The political compromise agreement appear as a mutual development sponsored by a community of mixed Chinese and Spanish mestizos who dominated the island's political dynamics and mode of political reproduction remained unchanged (Briones 1983).

Tracing the history of people in control of political positions when Cebu City was still a Spanish *ayuntamiento*, Cullinane (1981) describes leadership at the local *junta de*

ayuntamiento as consisting of mixed ethnic composition: Spanish *peninsulares*, Spanish mestizos, chinese mestizos, immigrant Filipinos, and local Filipino families. All these groups were considered prominent residents.

Most of these city councilors descended from families of landed aristocrats and held various occupations; some were lawyers, some held offices in the Spanish bureaucracy. Cullinane reported:

> "Between 1890 and 1898 some residents of Cebu served in the ayuntamiento. Twenty-five of them were peninsular Spaniards (nine had lasting commitment to Cebu, of whom at least five were married to Filipinas), 17 were Chinese mestizos (from 13 families), eight were local Spanish mestizos (four from the gremio de naturales), four were immigrant Filipinos, four were residents of San Nicolas, and only one was Cebuano from the gremio de naturales. The councilors represented the wealthiest and most prominent families of Cebu City. About half of them were merchants, but many of these had multiple occupations, usually combining commercial activities with some form of landholding. Twenty-five percent (25%) of the councilors were land owners, seven (11%) were lawyers, and nine or fifteen percent (15%) held (or had held) offices in the Spanish bureaucracy. (Cullinane in McCoy and De Jesus 1981:278)

Cebu City, is the oldest settlement established by Spain in the Philippines. In the first half of the 20th century, the cities' electoral contests were fought with intensity between elite factions or families and within families. Mojares (1986) in *The Man Who Would be President*, noted further that:

> "[A]t the very beginning of the century, elections were already marked by poll irregularities and political vendetta. In the 1903 municipal elections the returns from 6 municipalities were annulled because of irregularities. In the 1906 elections, the results of 25 of 41 towns were protested. Nine of those protested were subsequently annulled. A second election was held in the nine towns and again the results of three of these towns were voided. Such was the passion of the Cebuanos for politics that they came to be regarded as "the most politics-minded group in the country." In part, there was intense factionalism because political office in Cebu carried more prestige and bargaining power in national politics than the same office in lesser provinces… Moreover, the existence of media facilities in Cebu served to heighten the level of a factional intensity in the local sense." (Mojares 1986:34)

Political Settlement in Cebuano Politics

In the case of Cebu, literature suggests that political settlement is practiced among politicians especially in economic interests that are present in a combination of engagements in: (a) small town bosses; (b) district bosses; (c) provincial bosses; (d) political warlords; (e) political machines; (f) networks of patrons; and (g) electoral coercion.

Clans with large proprietary holdings in the province also dominate politics in their respective towns. Town executives from rich and powerful clans who own assets ranging from 300 to 500 hectares of coconuts and corn fields with a number of client tenants and farm workers hold power over Cebu's municipalities.

Agricultural landlords as well as leading personalities of organizations such as the Philippine Coconut Producers Federation (COCOFED) and others wielded political power over the masses. They commandeered business opportunities, such as owning or operating transport corporations, which monopolized ownership of buses plying provincial routes indispensable to commuters and inter-island trade (see Sidel 1999).

Small Town Bosses

The pattern of rent-seeking activities shows the symptomatic practices of town mayors as small town bosses representing the interests of local elite families (Sidel 1999:86). As local chief executives, they possess regulatory powers. They control dispensation of government funds, influence the location of construction of projects such as roads, public markets, and schools (Sidel 1999:84).

Town mayors also facilitated the employment of workers, award contracts, gain profits from overpriced projects or ghost projects, and payroll padding (Sidel 1999:84). Aside from this, their community control system includes the monopoly of franchise and permits for amusement centers, such as cockpits, which are granted as rewards to political allies who win in the local elections.

These practices do not only demarcate the line between the allies and the opposition, they also serve the purpose of gaining more allies (Sidel 1999:84-85). These practices have gradually expanded to other forms of bigger rent-seeking ventures such as constructions of golf courses, residential subdivisions, and industrial estates (Sidel 1999:84).

District Bosses

Some political clans develop power over a district supra-municipal structure, which forms a "distinctive dichotomy between town and countryside" (Sidel 1999:101). District supra-municipal dynasties that hold power in densely populated local economic centers became host to monopoly capital in the local economy. These district political dynasties served as structures of political power established through capital accumulation and political machine building that further entrench political clans.

These political dynasties positions in the political and economic rule sustain what Sidel (1999:102) refers to as "the coercive rather than clientelistic nature of production of social relations." District bosses decide the type of campaign strategies during elections at the national level. District

dynasties were able to transform the networks of municipal empires into political machines, which serve as weapons against challenges to their dynastic rule.

Sidel's view has been substantiated by the political reigns of the Durano family in the fifth district of Danao City, the Martinez family of Bogo in the fourth district, and the former rise of the Abines family of the second district (Sidel 1999:101).

Provincial Bosses

Early in the 20th century, the Osmeña family amassed the power of its political machine in the province. The Osmeña clan's predominance was attributed to astute business management and political savvy. This is seen in its continuing political alliance with the sophisticated, organized dynastic mercantile class in the province.

Sidel (1999:138) explained:

"At the provincial level, the Osmeña family dynasty dominated the political and economic life of Cebu for most of the twentieth century. It used its urban political machine in Cebu City and its alliances with major mercantile interests in the port metropolis to entrench itself over the generations. Unlike the congressional district-level dynasties in their bailiwicks, the Osmeña family never seized monopolistic control over the Cebu economy."

The Osmeñas' strategy to implement an extensive real estate development made them known among Cebuanos as the harbingers of development on the islands. Gradually, they transformed their social and economic network into a political machine, which operates with or without voluntary support of national patrons.

On this, Sidel (1999:138) noted:

"While not ashamed to promote family real-estate holdings and other business concerns, by means of state resources and powers, the Osmeñas have been careful to identify their interests with those of Cebu City's closely-knit local oligarchy, whose cartelized shipping companies, copra and corn processing facilities, and manufacturing concerns have long benefitted from government largesse."

The pattern shows the powerful political clans are in an advantaged position to distribute, control, and dispose of public lands and ultimately gain control over the local economy. This economic control was further reinforced by their use of institutionalizing means. They enacted ordinances and to levy taxes, granted business permits, special licenses, public works contracts, and monopoly franchises (Sidel 1999;Mojares 1986).

Provincial political leaders also wield power to broker for local oligarchs given their control over state resources that could be used to advance the interests of the clan or their networks (Sidel 1999:124-138). Hence, "[a]lthough the Cebu City Mayorship became an elective post in 1955, the office retained these considerable powers over the local state apparatus" (Sidel 1999:129). Once this is established, the provincial boss can easily mobilize the political machinery that can muster massive votes for the family and its allied candidates in the local, congressional and national elections.

This demonstrates the clan's capacity to cater to the interest of the leading merchant dynasties and command support from local capitalist class by utilizing linkages of large and small businesses. In the process, this network of enterprising Chinese mestizos worked as a durable machine legitimizing the Osmeña clan's leadership in the city districts and in the whole province (Sidel 1999:124-139).

With the rise of the Osmeñas to power in Cebu and in national politics also came the gradual rise of Chinese merchant families, who mostly were part of business cartels that controlled inter-island shipping industry at the turn of the 20th century (Sidel 1999:132; Briones 1983; Cullinane 1982).

II. Socio-cultural and Political Norms
Warlordism

Warlordism became a form of leadership entrenched within a system of organized and armed goons, special forces, and control of law enforcement. They exercise territorial control by means of intimidation, assassination, and corruption (Sidel 1999:106-107; Cullinane in McCoy 1998:169-170).

Cebu's warlordism was a political culture introduced during wartime politics. Ramon Durano, the patriarch of the clan in Danao City in Cebu was reputed to be the first Cebuano warlord while serving under the American forces during the Japanese occupation. In 1982, he reportedly gained monopoly of the production of *paltik* guns in Danao.

Winning votes proved his professed loyalty to powerful local and national patrons. In return, his patrons granted him franchises and control over the local territory. They became a privatized familial empire (Sidel 1999:111-112). The same norm allowed Durano to install a number of his relatives and *padrinos* in government offices [1], giving them many occasions for rent-seeking opportunities such as holding the office of customs collector, city tax assessor, and provincial fiscal (Cullinane1998).

Machine Politics

The concept of *hegemonization* according to Mojares (1998:322) is associated to the adage "leadership competence is what proves legitimate social power." The ethos of *good service as good politics* is shown in the competitive ability of the Osmeñas in the real estate business. It interweaves *public benefit with private gain* not only for their own family real estate enterprises but also to promote a norm of

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[1] See, for example, reports on the case of Paulo M. Durano acting surveyor of the Port of Cebu in the Morning Times (Cebu City), December 24, 1968.

entrepreneurship, *developmentalism, and modernity* among Cebu's provincial elites and to neighboring island bourgeoisie (Mojares in McCoy 1998:322).

Bailiwick-building for the Osmeñas commenced at Parian— a mercantilistic community of Chinese mestizos. This enabling layer can be traced to the history of rivalry for political leadership among three racial classes, namely: (a) the native Filipino-Cebuanos; (b) the Chinese mestizos; (c) the Spanish mestizos of Parian, Lutao and Pueblo, Cebu since the early part of the 19th century (Briones 1983; Cullinane 1982).

When he came to power, Sergio Osmeña, Sr. facilitated the entry of politicians in the rest of his clan. He used his political success to further expand his family business and proprietary fortunes. In a classic case of elite dominance, he combined both political and business acumen to build a political machine characterized by neo-patrimonialism (Mojares in McCoy 1998:317).

Patronage Networks

The *padrino system* in Cebu lends itself to the emergence of political preeminence through: (a) inter and intra familial social connectivity, affinity, and consanguinity; (b) loyal clients, patrons, or old political allies, and (c) friends and business associates. This is a crucial system that aspiring politicians need to go through as they enter politics.

A classic example is the case of Ramon Durano, who initially joined politics supported by Paulo Almendras, mayor of the municipality of Borbon in the 1940s and blood relative of the Duranos (Sidel 1999:106). Almendras was allied with the Osmeñas at the time. As he gained experience and influence in Danao (Cullinane in McCoy 1998:167), Durano honed his political savvy that enabled him to strengthen his political power by forging an alliance with provincial patron Mariano Jesus Cuenco. The alliance was said to be forged to promote their interests in the Danao Coal Mining Industry as well as the Cebu Portland Cement Company (CEPOC) in Naga, Cebu.

Early in his political career, Durano practiced the "slide rule" scheme in maintaining an alliance with Cuenco who then headed the Bando Cuenco political party. Cuenco had linkages with Philippines presidents Manuel Quezon, Manuel Roxas, Elpidio Qurino, and Ramon Magsaysay who at different times served as his national patrons (Sidel 1999:102-107; Cullinane 1998:174-177).

Learning the ropes from the Cuenco bloc in Cebu, Durano later grew more politically-astute and gained more power and control over Danao. Such power has further entrenched when he was introduced to President Carlos P. Garcia, a Boholano. With the disbandment of Bando Cuenco in the 1950s, Durano established other local political parties called the "combines," an aggrupation of Durano's relatives, former members and allies of Bando Cuenco. His sons-in-law put up the Durano-Zosa-Dumon (DZD) combine in North Cebu and later the Durano-Calderon-Sybico (DCS) combine in the Southern part of Cebu (Cullinane 1998:172-178).

Durano's 'combines' had its peak from 1957 to 1972. During this period, the clan enjoyed electoral victories in four provincial districts. It also mustered support from big politicians and landlords within the area of the 'combines'

(Cullinane 1998:173-74). The patriarch became the leader of the pro-Carlos Garcia voting bloc at the time after the Bando Cuenco disbanded.

Coercive Electoral Schemes

Real politik appeals for consent from the ruled. Election has been designed as a mechanism to prove political power in whatever form or manner. It is the feel for the game— called elections— that animate politicians to speak like actors about durability and legitimacy of their political dominance. Political dynamics carry various factors that serve as instrument of political governance and means of legitimation.

Coercive mechanisms and electoral fraud were not foreign to Cebuano politics. Mariano Jesus Cuenco first used special policemen in the 1949 elections drafting notorious characters in a special force formed to provide armed support to questionable election campaigns(The Philippines Free Press, Nov. 26, 1949 as cited by Sidel 1999).

In Danao, for instance, election fraud strategies included vote padding or inflating the number of voters, fabricated election returns, inflated registration listings, and school teachers who served as poll officials were used to facilitate fraudulent elections (Cullinane 1998:191-193).

In Cebu's political history, various strategies were employed that made elections work to the advantage of small-town bosses, district dynasties, provincial patrons, and national patrons. For favors that small-town politicians gained, such as the transformation of a rustic town into a City, votes were delivered to the benevolent patron in return. For example, Danao's transformation into a city resulted in Cebuano voting "substantially for President Garcia" (Cullinane 1998:175). Consequently, the Duranos emerged as a force in the anti-Osmeña bloc and rose as the dominant provincial politician in Cebu. This enabled the administration to sustain political power even after EDSA I (Cullinane 1998:185).

III. Democratic Transitions and Early Reform Politicians

Democratic transitions are taken from document review via comparative historical analysis (CHA). This method is crucial in tracing the characteristic origins of literature that tackle reform politics.

It is a material necessary especially in tracing the social foundations of long-term growth of states with uneven levels of development in the past (Mahoney and Veblen 2015; Doner, Ritchie, and Slater 2005; Kohli 2004; Kang 2002).

The crucial question, however, lies at tracing the origins of Philippine social relations. The debate in CHA, boils down to the role of more distal versus proximate causes, issues of historical consequence as premises of path dependence, case selections, and causal inferences from these documents.

Cumings (1984), in tracing the origins of the Developmental States (DS), suggests that colonialism is a "natural period" to start with. Using this premise, the paper ties up the colonial history of the Philippines and the wider debate on state formation of the Filipino nation. Furthermore, it also accounts for the historical continuum that shows how responses

from anti-colonial nationalist movements have altered the basic state forms inherited from colonialism.

The series of movements that provide socio-cultural foundations for a Filipino state formation and reform politics can be traced back to the following: (a) recorded massive uprisings prior to 1745; (b) popular uprisings; (c) the secularization movement of the Filipino clergy; and (d) nationalist movements such as the propaganda movement and the Katipunan revolution, which were first to call for assets reforms and assets redistribution.

It must be noted that before the Spaniards came, there was no centralized national government that connected all 7,000 islands of the Philippines. It was the Spanish colonial government which attempted to create a semblance of statehood among islands.

However, the connectivity among islands did not genuinely uphold modern democratic pinciples of transparency and open competition for government participation was not dispersed among the native citizenry. The Spaniards intended it to be so, knowing that their colonial interests would be in jeopardy if there was genuine unification among the Filipino people.

The formation of the Filipino nation commenced with the massive uprisings in the last two years of Spanish administration in the Islands (Veneracion 1987). Democratic transitions and reform movements in the Philippines are instructive of the patterns of uprisings at the start of Filipino nationhood after 333 years of Spanish colonial administration.

A crucial period of revolutionary uprisings took place from 1745 to the 1800s. This was characterized by the natives' defiance against the colonial power and its abuses and were abetted by growing anti-colonial and anti-feudal sentiments. These latter forms of uprisings were seen as: (a) the Filipino response to the land issues; (b) Filipino response against the colonial economic policies; (c) popular protest movements; (d) continuing challenges of Muslim Filipinos against the colonial administration; and (e) continuing challenges of the Cordillera People's against the colonial powers (Constantino 1975:226-345).

IV. Turning Points in the History of Reforms
First Turning Point: The Popular Uprisings

Ileto's (1979) *Pasyon and Revolution: Popular Movements in the Philippines* (1840-1910) and David Sturtevant's (1976) *Popular Uprisings in the Philippines* both account for classic forms of resistance, which serve as catalyst to the country's history of political transitions.

This resistance have religious and political roots. Some theories also suggest that the root of uprisings also have a cult-like character based on folk Catholicism. Fanatical believers practiced, idolatry, *kulam* (native sorcery), magic, and mysticism.

These practices also assigned symbolic identities to individuals such as Jesus Christ, God the Father, Mother Mary, and the demon as in Papa Isio's uprising in Negros Island, the Cofradia de San Jose, or the *Guardia de Honor*.

The practices made them believe that they were invincible. This thinking, in turn, emboldened them to resist perceived threats. Colonial control is one such threat to be led to resistance and uprising.

In Phelan's (1959) work *The Hispanization of the Philippines: Spanish Aims and Filipino Responses,* it was noted that missionary work was only effective at the urban centers or poblacion-plaza complex where the ancient Spanish rule imposed *reducciones* or reduction of communities into compact village arrangements within the reach of the church bells (Phelan 1959:72).

Seventy percent of native population lived in peripheral communities. The religious missions were not as successful in their works in the mountainous areas and farms around the town peripheries because the rural folks were tied up to their land (Phelan 1959:75). Anderson2006) explained in *Imagined Communities* the religio-political instructions were left to the vague understanding among farmers and many village folks. Their belief was formed based on their imagination of the Catholic teachings.

This is because farm homesteads were far from the *Iglesia* (church) and hardly received formal religious teachings from the Spanish missions from the town centers. And even though there was constant need of parish priests, Filipino priests were discriminated against holding parish posts. This was a privilege exclusive to the Spanish clergy.

For the rural village folks, the only time they could go to church is during Holy Week, *Corpus Christi,* and for festivities of patron saints. This resulted to two types of Christians in the Philippines. One is that of the Spanish style Catholicism and the other is a distinctly Filipino folk Catholicism (Phelan 1959:88).

Popular uprisings occurred prior to and after the Katipunan revolution. They continued during the American transition in the millenarian movements (Sturtevant 1976). Similar uprisings had sustained even at the turn of the 20th century from the end of the Filipino American War up to the administration of the American Bureau of Insular Affairs (Anderson 2006; Agoncillo 1990; Ileto 1979; Sturtevant 1976; Constantino 1975).

The Second Turning Point : The Secularization Movement of the Church

The Secularization Movement of the Church, was another crucial turning point for the development of progressive and reform politics in the Philippines.

The clash between regular and secular clergies, during Spanish administration, was another root of radicalism targeted against religious institutions in the country. This conflict commenced with the episcopal visitation of parishes which were under the care of the regular clergy as early as the 16th century.

Due to lack of secular priests in many localities in the early stages of colonization, the King allowed the regulars to assume temporary authority over the parishes. It was only in 1581 that the ecclesiastical arrangements were finalized.

However, the structure of the Christianizing mission of the church was already in place long before the expedition

set foot in the islands. Most parishes would later fall into the hands of the religious orders through the *patronato real*. The century that followed saw the increase in number of secular priests who provided better administration of the parishes.

The insulars of both church and government were the first to instigate secularization of the parishes even before the end of the 18th century. The insulars asserted representation from their social class, not only in church but in civil government as well. These started the conflicts of peninsulars and insulars who both had Spanish forebears.

Schumacher's *The Propaganda Movement (1880-1895): The Creators of a Filipino Consciousness The Makers of a Revolution* published in 1973 and *The Revolutionary Clergy: The Filipino Clergy and the Nationalist Movement (1850-1903)* published in 1981 gave accounts on how the secularization movements of the church were secretly put in place through the efforts of Fathers Gomez, parish priest of Bacoor and vicar forane of Cavite, and Father Pedro Pelaez, secretary of the Archbishop of Manila. Readers get a glimpse on the origins of the Insular and Filipino nationalism from these readings.

According to Schumacher (1981), the movements were triggered by widespread abuses and discrimination against the Filipino clergy who were lowly treated as unworthy. The tension escalated when the regulars attempted to divest the secular priests of their administered parishes.
Father Pedro Pelaez was the first to denounce what the local clergy perceived as oppressive action by Spanish friars.

When Pelaez died in an earthquake that hit Manila, Fathers Gomez, Burgos, and Zamorra carried on with the fight against the questioned friar orders. The three priests, however, were charged later with mutiny and sentenced to death by hanging. In February 17, 1872 they died as martyrs (Schumacher 1981:1-330).

In the later part of the 18th century, the fight against inequalities in the government and the church, education, and livelihood opportunities became common themes in revolutionary visions.

Veneracion's (1997) *Agos ng Dugong Kayumanggi: Isang Kasaysayan ng Pilipinas,* Ileto's *Pasyon and Revolution: Popular Movements in the Philippines (1840-1910), Agoncillo's (1990) History of the Filipino People;* Majul's (1977) *Muslims in the Philippine,* Gowing (1979) *Muslim Filipinos– Heritage and Horizon,* and Fast and Richardson's (1979) *Roots of Dependency Political and Economic Revolution 19th Century Philippines* postulate the factors that led to the rise of nationalism among natives under Spanish oppressive rules.

These were: (a) The exile of native laborers as a result of trade monopoly and the imposition of tax obligations on cash crops (Veneracion 1997:53); (b) even with the various tactics employed by the Spanish government to stop the political unification of the Filipinos, the essence of the native Filipino culture was sustained; (c) the belief in the *anitos*, *diwatas*, and *anting-antings* (amulets) continued (Veneracion 1997:53); and (d) the story of the passion, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ, which the friars used to strengthen the native's religious piety and faith in Catholicism, was transformed by the natives into a metaphor of their struggles and a guide to the liberation of their consciousness (Ileto 1979:11-27).

Moreover, the spread of modernity came with the opening of port areas (1834) in Manila, and later in Pangasinan, Iloilo, Zamboanga, Cebu, Tacloban, and Legazpi which resulted in the establishment of the banking system and the advancement of local trade (Agoncillo 1990: 118).

Free trade with other states, also resulted in brisk production of the Manila Hemp in the Bicol region, coffee at Batangas, tabacco at the Cagayan Valley, and sugar cane in Pampanga, Iloilo, and Negros islands (Agoncillo 1990:119).

These trade and production schemes paved the way for the development of local transportation, exchange, agriculture, and commerce. These afforded the natives opportunities to hone their social consciousness, heightened awareness, and shaped their sense of nationhood (Ileto 1979:6)

The structural shift of indigenous society from its ethnic to trade-driven lifestyle, gave rise to the Filipino bourgeoisie that started with the *Ilustrado* class, from the ranks of natives, mestizos and creoles who were either landed gentry or compradors (Majul 1977:10-16). The Ilustrados who acquired their landholding or businesses, studied in the local universities and in Europe.They were the ones who pursued reforms during the Spanish rule (Majul 1977:7).

Education paved the way for the weakening of regionalism in the 1860s and the 1870s initially with the passage of the Moret Decree of 1863, institutionalizing basic education all over the Philippine archipelago, and the imposition of Spanish language instructions as a national language (Fast and Richardson 1979:55).

From 1886 to 1887, a number of children already studied the basic courses. There were more Indios and mestizos (1,769) than Spaniards (220) who had undergone basic education. It was in the school environment where social interactions and acquisition of new ideas were fostered. The school system became the breeding ground for the rudimentary notion of national identity. Filipinos began to identify themselves as either creole, Chinese *mestizo*, or *indio* (Fast and Richardson 1979:56).

The Third Turning Point: The Nationalist Movement

The works of Schumacher (1973 and 1981), and the books of Constantino (1975), Corpuz (1990), and Agoncillo (1990) provide extensive historical accounts on the nationalist movements in the Philippines. These books show the coercive implementation of commercial agriculture and the opening of the Philippines to world trade, which transformed the lives of the Filipinos.

Insular nationalism originated from the feudal and agricultural economy rooted in the native Filipino way of life. The colonial regimes later changed these indigenous economic life into one more responsive to the national and international markets. Agricultural production, which were customarily intended for local needs were turned into export products.

The change in their economic framework further brought the transformation of their social and cultural life. It paved way for the deeper stratification of Filipino citizens into

distinctive social classes such as the *Principalia* and the *Ilustrado* who served as heralds of social change in the period.

The native Chinese and Chinese mestizos (De Jesus 1989;Wickberg 1973) led the change, especially in terms of administration of the lands. The subsistence economy, then enough to serve individual needs in the community, was restructured to satisfy the demands of the foreign markets than to address the needs of the natives.

In 1745 to 1892, the disparity created a new wave of unrest manifested in a new pattern of resistance that was no longer a reflection of religio-political discontent. It was a reflection of their discontent into anti-friar, anti- colonial government official or anti-colonial, and anti-feudal sentiments.

Blaire and Robertson *Volume V* (1898) compliments to the works of Schumacher (1973), Constantino (1975), and Agoncillo (1990). The works pointed out contributory factors that led to the shift in Filipino consciousness in these periods. These factors were: (a) the continued internal strength of the native culture; (b) the opening of the Philippines to world trade and the new economic policies; (c) the introduction of formal education through the Moret Decree of 1863; and (d) the Secularization movement of the church and the martyrdom of fathers Gomez, Burgos, and Zamora.

Works of Agoncillo (1990), Scumacher (1981;1973), and Constantino (1975) traced the development of the pioneers in the Filipino nationalist movement in the 1880s and identified progressive students as its leaders when they demanded change in the Spanish government.

The major roles of propagandists like Jose Rizal, Marcelo H. Del Pilar, and Graciano Lopez Jaena were recognized as purveyors in the pursuit of reforms, in shaping ideas of nationhood, and the formation of a genuine Filipino national consciousness (Constantino 1975).

Rizal wrote Noli Me Tangere and El Filibusterismo. The writings of Del Pilar effectively rebutted the anti-Filipino writings of Wenceslao Retana, Pablo Feced, and Vicente Barrantes in *La Politica de España*. In the same manner the fortnightly paper, *La Solidaridad*, was published and managed by Rizal, Del Pilar, and Lopez Jaena (Constantino 1975:152-153).

The Fourth Truning Point: Propaganda Movement, to KKK Nationalist Revolution

Cushner's (1973) *Spain in the Philippines: From Conquest to Revolution* summarizes the development of a nationalist Filipino consciousness by accounting for the worsening abuses by Spanish colonizers, the absence of basic freedoms, and the Ilustrados' movement for reforms.

His work pointed that portion of the elite population pushed for the Philippines to become a province of Spain and pushed for the acquisition of freedoms that only Spanish citizens then enjoyed. Furthermore, Cushner also recounted how the *La Liga Filipina* later transformed as a central voice for nationalist sentiments as it organizationally changed in 1892 to serve as systematic propaganda machine against the Spaniards.

Cushner (1973), described the time in which the movement occurred as the "period of the propaganda" and calls the players behind the movement "propagandists." The propaganda committee was established in Manila in 1888. The active participation of Marcelo H. Del Pilar in the movement, and as founder of the newspaper *Diariong Tagalog* brought him to Europe as representative of the group (Cushner 1973:222). This period was considered by experts as the time of commencement of the propaganda movement and crucial to the nationalist movement of Filipino youth in 1880s.

The initial aim of the movement was to pursue reforms since the propagandists had aspired more for assimilation than independence (Cushner 1973:222). This was based on the aspiration toward assimilation rather than independence. They voiced their appeals for reforms through pamphlets, leaflets, magazines, books and by actual lobbying.

According to Cushner, the *Ilustrado* organizations actively involved in the propaganda movement, include the *Circulo-Hispano-Filipino*, *Cavite de Propaganda*, *Asociacion Hispano-Filipino*, and the papers *La Solidaridad* and *La Liga Filipina*. Their demands included: (a) the recognition of the Philippines as a province of Spain; (b) equality between Spaniards and Filipinos before the law; (c) Filipino representation in the Spanish Cortes; and (d) the appointment of Filipino Clergy into parishes and the removal of friar priests. Economic demands include: (a) the stabilization of the policies of "free trade" in the Philippines and the removal of sanctions on trade; (b) finding ways to provide better markets for Filipino products; and (c) to expedite measures in the liberalization of the country's economic affairs.

The movement was launched in Spain as there was no freedom of expression in the country. Despite of this, certain local organizations took the courage to express the need for reforms in the country. One of them was the *Diariong Tagalog,* which was published under the auspices of Del Pilar. The other was *Asosacion Hispano Filipino*, which was established in Spain in July of 1888 under the leadership of Miguel Morayta.

The *La Liga Filipina* was established in July 3, 1892 to realize the formation of a prime Filipino nation. The election of the *La Liga* officers took place in the household of Ong-Junco in Manila. Ambrosio Salvador was elected as President, Agustin de la Rosa as Fiscal, Bonifacio Arevalo as Treasurer, and Deodato Arellano as Secretary.

Dr. Jose Rizal was appointed adviser and also drafted the constitution with the following objectives: (a) the unification of all Islands of the archipelago under one representative to the Spanish Courts; (b) equal protection for all; (c) Pursue the right to resistance against all forms of oppression and injustice; (d) the advancement of education, agriculture, and trade; and (e) to engage in all forms of study and efforts toward reforms.

V. The Nature of Contemporary Philippine Politics

From national histories crafted by scholars Agoncillo, Guerrero, Constantino, Majul, Hutchcroft, Sidel, McCoy, and Tan are accounts on contemporary Philippine politics largely shaped by the American colonial institutions and clothed in

republicanism form, such as: The municipal code of 1901; The Schurman Commission; The Philippine Bill of 1902 originally known as the Cooper Act; The Jones Law (1916); and the Tydings McDuffie Law.

These are also shown in the work of May (1984) entitled *Social Engineering in the Philippines: The Aims, Execution and Impact of American Colonial Policy (1900-1913),* which accounts for strategies of reconstituting the Filipino villages to transform the native's everyday life. Its contributions in comparative colonial studies is a valuable interpretative work on institutionalism.

There is extensive scholarly work that explores the analytical tracts of the dyadic factional model in Philippine politics. Pattern shows why election campaigns and governments are monopolized by the wealthy who support local politicians.

The subject is also elaborated in the works of Hollnsteiner's (1963) *Dynamics of Power in a Philippine Municipality*, Lande's (1965) *Leaders, Factions, and Parties: The Structure of Philippine Politics*, and Agpalo's (1972) *The Political Elite and the People: A Study of Politics in Oriental Mendoro.*These studies demonstrate the building blocks of Philippine politics founded in alliances, factions and kinship, exchanges of goods and services, as well as political machines (Kerkvliet 1991:8).

Corpuz's (1990) *Roots of the Filipino Nation Vol. I and Vol. II*, Kerkvliet's (1990) *Everyday Politics in the Philippines Class and Status Relations in a Central Luzon Village*, and Simbulan's (2005) *The Modern Principalia: The Historical Evolution of the Philippine Ruling Oligarchy* provide synoptic accounts on the development of patronage politics.

These works analyze how contemporary leadership in Philippine politics became a monopoly of the middle and upper class clans who first established prominence as the *Principalia,* who were originally the prominent land-owning and propertied chieftains, during the Spanish colonial period.

In Mindanao these were the *sultan*s and *datu*s who resisted Spanish rule. They later become the *Illustrado,* the few big native landowners who were literate in the Spanish language, politically influential, and belong to the socio-economic elite and ruling class (Simbulan 2005; Corpus 1957).

The literature also describes the changes in the hierarchical structure of Philippine politics. Corpuz 1957 and Simbulan 2005 emphasized the similarities in political change across the Philippine archipelago. As David Rosenberg (1974) summarizes:

> "These observations about the apparent immutability of rural society no doubt reflect some element of fact. Traditional ways have indeed persisted throughout the "decades of development". When such changes have occurred in the rural sector, they often have been attributed to developments in the urban, national, or external environment."

From Reducciones to Townships and Electoral Politics

May (1984) reveals the institutionalization of rational-legal bureaucracy American-style in both national and local governments in the country, as well as the system of public school instructions under Act No. 174 for compulsory basic education and English instructions. The first bureaucrats in pursuance of Act No. 854 known as the *Pensionado Program* that sent children of Filipino oligarchs for foster-parenting and political education to the US. When the *pensionados* came back to the Philippines, they formed part of the original bureaucrats that ran the Philippine state during American occupation through the Commonwealth, and even until after the Japanese occupation.

Literature focuses on the mutual aid networks founded on the web of familial ties because this appears to be the most durable theory of Philippine politics. This widely affirmed by academics, journalists, diplomats who observed that Filipino politics indeed revolve around interpersonal relationships, relies on the familial social relations, concedes to the patron client norm, and reifies personalistic factions (Kervliet 1991; Agpalo 1972; Lande 1965; Hollnsteiner 1963).

Salazar's (1997) historical perspective demonstrates that significant political transformation occurred through merger and interchange between native leadership categories and colonial categories from the time of Spanish intervention until after the time of the Katipunan revolution of 1896. He argues that strands of colonial politics overlapped with the emerging native politics in reoriented functions and new leadership ideologies. Furthermore, he showed how the new native politics accommodated resistance-oriented leaders, from the pre-war and post-war periods, to the Marcos period.

Salazar's (1997) periodization and categorization of sources of leadership and orientation suggests a heuristic device for understanding the political development of the Philippines according to: (a) types and categories of leadership; (b) tasks and obligations of leaders; (c) origins and sources of leadership; (d) characteristics of leadership; (e) ideologies or overarching principles and approaches of leadership; (f) language and discourse or the delineated leadership culture; and (g) notions of sovereignty and factors result to the loss of one's sovereignty and/or credibility as a leader.

Moreover, Salazar provides proof of evolution of native Filipino political structure and culture according to a defined framework with the following constituitive elements: (a) the basic political institutions such as the four pillars of leadership in the country— the *datu*, *babaylan*, *panday*, and *bagani*; (b) the formation of the nation; and (c) the formation of Philippine society and politics.

Anderson's (1995) *Cacique Democracy in the Philippines: Origins and Dreams*, however, shows how democratic institutions emerge in the context of the rule of law as popularized by the native upper classes (*cacique*) who later became the country's political administrators alongside Spanish religious institutions– the Catholic Church and schools, as well as private business and various enterprises. The so-called "cacique democracy" became entrenched in the archipelago overtime.

However, parallel to this period of transition from Spanish to American administration also came political institutions such what was reported in May's (1984) work. May

explained that the establishment of the bureaucracy came from the breakdown of national to subnational or local government units. May's work is very important as it aids us in understanding the extent of popular participation in governance from national down to the barangay level as early as the turn of the 20th century.

American intervention through the institutionalization of the electoral process became a critical feature of democratic political dynamics. This paved the way for the change in political orientation of mestizos and participation of the common native.

Cacique democracy, thrived on a political environment where elections, political parties, and factions became the most popular institutional exercise, giving rise to the creation of government units from the biggest to the smallest unit— the barangay.

Politicians regularly shifted from one camp to the other. Their relationship with their contenders and constituents became highly personality-based and founded on ideals of reciprocity or *utang na loob*. With this, turncoatism also emerged and made party loyalty an expendable commodity. Political arrangements became patrimonial. (Agpalo 1972:374; Lande 1965:10-123; Hollnsteiner 1963:86-110).

Philippine Developmentalism and the Emergence of Reform Politics

A historical surveys of reforms in the period of Independence (1898) to EDSA I (1986) show a series of resistance as well as massive sources of literature in political reforms. These movements reflect the genuine context and sentiment leading to the formation of a truly independent nation. They are integral parts of the key enabling mechanisms for a developmental Philippine state amid a neo-colonial order from the Roxas leadership to the contemporary regimes.

The development of the peasant movements and the agrarian revolution waged by such groups as the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB) or the People's Liberation Army, and the Bagong Hukbong Bayan (BHB) New People's Army are also important institutions to consider when it comes to understanding sources of resistance relative to the context of the sources of political reforms.

VI. The History of Neo-Colonial relationship between the US and the Philippines

On July 4, 1946, the United States (US) government granted the Philippine independence with a promise that the Philippines will be given full freedom and would gain full state membership in the international community after 10 years of tutelage starting 1935 (in pursuant to the Tydings McDuffie Law). The restriction placed the country in an awkward position as regards to its status in the international affairs.

Standing as an independent state was a struggle since majority of nations were facing reconstruction problems after World War II. With resources devastated and livelihood in shambles, everyone had to start from scratch. The Filipino leadership had no choice but to rely on the US blueprint for the Philippine development.

There were manifestations that made the Philippines appear like a truly independent state: there was a flag and a constitution and elections were held. In reality, however, the US was running the administration of the Philippine state (Guerrero 1979). But the country's path to development was hampered by the United State's constant intervention in the Philippine affairs. In fact, the relationship between the US and the Philippines in early 1946 was a neo-colonial one.

From this, it can be surmised that although the colonial structure was no longer deep seated, the country's independence is superficial. According to nationalist historian Renato Constantino, the neo-colonial system is realized in the following manner:

> "It means the continued US dominance over the state of the economy of the nation. We become a market of American products, or their source of raw materials, if not an open field of American capital. To guarantee their control over us and likewise to guarantee that the country becomes a launching pad of all American military operations within Asia, the US made sure of the installation of its naval and air base in Philippine territory that is not necessarily part of their sovereignty."
> (Constantino and Constantino 1979:213-214)

It is now imperative to scrutinize the political-economic mechanisms established by the US in the Philippines. What constitutes all these mechanisms? In what way did the US retain control over a state that was granted pseudo-independence?

Hisorical work written by Constantino (1975), Agoncillo (1990), and Corpus (1990) tell us how the US was able to maintain its hold on supposedly-independent Philippine state. The resource base and the security of the country during the neo-colonial period were tied up to: (a) sustained free trade and parity rights with the American citizens; and (b) the establishment of military bases and the cooperation between American servicemen and the Philippine Army (Constantino and Constantino 1997).

Constantino and Constantino's (1997) *Filipinas*: *Ang Bagong Lumipas II: 1940-1965 salin in Ariel Borlongan* and Stephen (1986) *The United States and the Philippines,* suggest that neo-colonialism could mean greater freedoms for the Philippines.

The literature advances the view that the neo-colonial relationship between the US and the Philippines could set the stage for a broader independence absent in colonialism. The Philippines had had more elbow room in postwar 1946. Stephen (1986:183) argues:

> "To say that colonialism was replaced by neo-colonialism is not to suggest that the two relationships are equivalent.The latter gives the Philippines more freedom to maneuver, it can play great powers off against one another, it can join regional pacts, it can garner support in international organizations. Neo-colonialism also places greater constraints

upon the action of the United States. American personnel may be stationed in the Philippines only with Manila's consent, US intervention in the Philippine affairs cannot be too overt, and US officials must take pain not to offend Philippine sovereignty and nationalism. In short, even if the only difference between the colonial and the neo-colonial relationships was a legal one —the specific locus of sovereignty— this difference can have a significant effect on the behavior of nation-states."

Although, the independence of the country gained during the period was not the idea the Filipinos had aspired for, it was a kind that could open the door to broader freedoms. At least, in a neo-colonial system, there is arguably more room for a former colony to be more innovative.

Thus, it is then incumbent upon the Filipino nation to have worked for a total independence. The way to transform the country's neo-colonial history is to view the past with a better perspective of the Philippine-US foreign relations.

A comparative historical analysis (CHA) starting with the Third Republic or that which commenced in 1946, suggests that: (a) leadership patterns in Philippine political administration and state structure were products of unusual concentrations of power and coercive capability of the landed and comprador classes (Guerrero 2005:101-123); and that (b) the Philippine state eventually collaborated with American imperial interest in the Asia Pacific region (Guerrero 2005:68-72;74-78).

This Philippine style of developmental state is one which Kohli (2004:17) refers to as that of a neo-patrimonial state.

It is then crucial to examine each leadership style of the elected executive from 1946 up to 1970s as foundation of a contemporary developmental state.

The Rise of the Hukbalahap

This paper argues that if the start of the propaganda movement served as the leading turning point in the conceptualization of national reforms that paved way for nationalist consciousness and the idea of state formation and revolution against colonialism, the rise of the *Hukbalahap* can be considered as the second major turning point, in the development the concept of Filipino liberation.

In the works of Guerrero (2005:32-34) and Constantino (1975:398-404) are sections on the heroism of the *Hukbalahap* as anti-Japanese revolutionary forces and their strong clamor for reforms as historically interwoven with the strongest aspirations of the Filipino people.

The *Hukbalahap* was a watershed of Filipino reform social movement of, by, and for the Filipinos. It had a purely Filipino people's army, which organized provincial and municipal governments fighting against actual fascist colonial aggression (Guerrero 2005:32-34 and Constantino 1975:398-404). The Hukbalahap fought the Japanese army after the American forces left the country.

All over the country Filipinos experienced suppression at the hands of the Military Police Command's USAFFE puppets and the erstwhile Japanese Constabulary. After the war, landlords took back full control of their lands and demanded rental arrears from the peasants and organized their private armies.

The office of the *Hukbalahap* was raided by the US Counter-Intelligence Corps and transferred it to the city of Manila from San Fernando, Pampanga. A Democratic Alliance was formed for a pretend republic to operate while the *Hukbalahap* was converted into the *Hukbalahap* Veteran's League.

There were mass arrests and tortures of red fighters and common people. There were also massacres of families and assassinations perpetrated by the military police and the civilian guards (Guerrero 2005:33).

What made things worse is that the Filipino freedom fighters decide to give up their fight for independence after they were convinced by Lava and Taruc who thought that the people were already tired of war and that independence would simply fall from the hands of the enemy.

The Third Republic of the Philippines and the US-backed Regimes: Roxas (1946-1948)

Zaide's (1996) *Documentary Sources of Philippine History Tomo XII* reveals the leadership style of Manuel Roxas and his connivance with the US. His administration passed the "Parity Rights Agreement." He ordered the expulsion from the parliament of congressmen who stood against the agreement.

He passed the US-RP military bases agreement and inaugurated the Clark Airfield and the Subic Naval Base. His National Land Settlement Administration (NLSA), was the agency responsible for the resettlement policy, which served as the assets reforms program for the state instead of direct redistribution of previously contested lands prior to the Third Republic.

In the US-RP relations, colonialism was kept on solid ground. The US monetary assistance had parallel provisions to sustain its interests in the Philippines. The US infused USD 620 million into the Philippine economy, but never provided any provision for reparation of damages, should there be transgressions in the implementation of "parity rights" between Filipinos and Americans in the exploitation of local resources (Tan 1997:91-92).

Quirino Period (1948-1953)

Santos' (1999) *The Presidents of the Postwar Republic, 1946-1965*" in Rosario Cortes' (1999) *Philippine Presidents: 100 years*, Constantino and Constantino's (1997) *Filipinas: Ang Bagong Lumipas II (1940-1965)* and Guerrero's (1979) *Philippine Society and Revolution,* provide literature on Quirino's administration.

Vice President Elpidio Quirino took-over the presidency when Roxas died. His term established various agricultural infrastructures. He was steadfast in his belief that agricultural development should go hand in hand with industrial development (Santos 1999:193). Guerrero (1979) in *Philippine Society and Revolution* writes:

"Fearing the onrush of the revolutionary mass movement, Quirino acted to inveigle the people with an offer of amnesty to the Hukbalahap and a pledge to reinstate and pay the back salaries of the Democratic Alliance congressmen who had been ousted in 1946. The principal condition set for the granting of such concessions was the surrender of arms and the registration of the Red fighters of the *Hukbalahap*."(Guerrero 2005: 36-37)

Quirino signed the *Mutual Defense Treaty* with America on on the 1st of August 1951. Militarization put an end to the *Hukbalahap*. Then Secretary of State, Ramon Magsaysay, was tasked to round up the *Hukbalahap*. The Americans aggressively intervened using the strategy of attraction boosting Magsaysay's image as a man for the masses, rather than as a "huk killing machine" in a psychological warfare that ensued (Constantino and Constantino 1997:263).

Magsaysay Period (1954-1957)

In Cortes' (1999) *Philippine Presidents: 100 Years*, Zaide's (1996) *Documentary Sources of Philippine History Tomo XI*, and Guerrero's (1979) *Philippine Society and Revolution*, it was revealed how Magsaysay worked under US instructions. He was elected congressman in his district and later became secretary of the Department of National Defense before he became president in 1953 (Santos in Cortes 1999:194-195).

The duplicitous Magsaysay administration stood for the masses and served the American interest at the same time that it was at the peak of American intervention in Philippine governance. This was the time of cold war, between the US and the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).

The US financial assistance was always the crucial factor in Magsaysay's agenda and counter revolutionary strategies to stop the rebellion among ailing farmers and workers as the foundation of his administration.

Nationalist Senator Claro M. Recto to lambasted the position of the Magsaysay administration. Magsaysay defended his position, saying he was making a "positive form of nationalism" (Guerrero 1979:43) Guerrero in *Philippine Society and Revolution* (2005:40-41) elaborated:

"…the Magsaysay puppet regime sabotaged the ceaseless popular demand for the abrogation of the Bell Trade Act by negotiating for its mere revision. Thus did the Laurel-Langley Agreement come into being. This new treaty aggravated the economic subservience of the Philippines to US imperialism by allowing the US monopolies to enjoy parity rights in all kinds of business."

Garcia Period (1957-1961)

Lichauco (1982), Agoncillo and Guerrero (1986), Zaide (1996), and Constantino and Constantino (1997) reveal how Carlos P. Garcia continued the policies of the Magsaysay administration. Garcia's regime can be considered the prime of Philippine developmental state. His administration was technocratic. It became a historical foundation of the Philippine developmental state. After winning the presidency in 1957, Garcia focused on programs emphasizing economic freedoms.

During Garcia's regime, the National Economic Council (August 21, 1958), pushed for the resolution entitled the *Filipino First Policy* as basis of the economy despite the flooding of foreign capital into the nation. This stabilized Filipino enterprises in an economy where foreign capital is very strong. Although the policy started as a limited form of nationalist expression, the concept actually motivated the opening of hidden nationalist feelings to flare up. It is a very simple slogan but it threatened powerful blocks such as the American business clubs in the Philippines (Constantino and Constantino 1997:335).

In the 1950s the nation was again torn by two opposing sentiments, namely: (a) the need to promote a self-reliant economy, a condition considered still advanced in Garcia's time; and (b) the anxiety over the weakening of the American financial grip.

Under Garcia's administration, the establishment of an "integrated steel industry" to be funded by government capital was given due consideration. The Iligan Integrated Steel Mills, Inc. was then built.

Through adoption of mercantilist policies, the Philippines accomplished in ten years what it failed to accomplish in fifty years of free trade. This is a dramatic transformation of what used to be a preponderantly agricultural, import-export economy, into a semi industrial economy.

This was clearly reflected in the sharp increase in the industrial contribution to the nation's overall productivity. In 1949, the contribution of our so-called "industrial" sector to the gross national product was a meager 8%. By 1960, it rose to 17.9%.

This is a conclusive proof that our obsolete, antiquated economy was undergoing a structural transformation and that an industrial revolution Philippine-style was very much in progress (Lichauco 1988:30).

Macapagal Period (1962-1965)

Lichauco in Jose (1988), Zaide (1996), Constantino and Constantino (1997), and Santos in Cortes (1999) provide us a glimpse of Diosdado Macapacal's regime. Before he became president, he was elected congressman in 1953, then as vice president in 1957. Of all the Philippine presidents, some claim that he was the one who truly hails from the masses— "the poor boy of Lubao." Under his administration, the economy relapsed to the foreign model.

Macapagal wanted to alleviate the conditions of ordinary Filipinos. However, he failed to provide a comprehensive solution to the country's problems. An example is the *Agricultural Land Reform Code (ALRC) of 1963* that was suppose to pull up the status of farmers. However, the change of the farmer's status in relation to landowners was subject to the latter's consent and there were only a few communities where this system worked. The law, conclusively, became ineffective in providing economic stability to the supposed beneficiaries.

On the surface, the Macapagal administration, was nationalistic. The expansion of our national territory appeared to be what the administration intended to offer to the nation. For instance, it vowed to reclaim Sabah.

Furthermore, it tried to renew the significance of Philippine sovereignty and moved the country's Independence Day from July 4, 1946 to June 12, 1898. The first celebration was on June 12, 1962 and was witnessed by almost a million Filipinos at the Luneta Park (Santos in Cortes 1999:208).

The celebration reflected a spectacle that highlighted how "independence" meant deeply to the Filipino people. Macapacal, in a way, succeeded to strengthen the illusion of sovereignty as his foreign policy remained pro-American.

It is arguably an illusion since most Filipinos still use the idea of indepence to puruse personal interests. On a national scale, the Macapagal administration still pursued economic policies that favor the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) (Constantino and Constantino 1997:342).

The Philippines was reopened to free trade after Macapagal's "de-control policy" was implemented. American corporations pulled out USD300 million in profits and was not able to repatriate during the Filipino First Policy of tight economic control (Constantino and Constantino 1997:246-247).

Macapagal hoped that through US financial aid, the government's intensive need for US Dollars can be addressed. Hence, from that time on the dictates of the IMF and WB became the ruler of Philippine economy.

The following are the effects of Macapagal's policy for national development (Lichauco in Jose 1988:32-38): (a) from an exchange rate of PHP2 to USD1, it became PHP3.90 to USD1, which caused the inflation of goods in the local market; (b) the flooding of foreign goods that weakened and caused the death of local industries; (c) the increased need for dollars to support the country's involvement in foreign trade, which triggered foreign debts to increase from USD360 million in 1962 into USD599.5 million in 1965; (e) decrease in the contribution of the manufacturing sector to the national economy from 17.9% to 17.1%; and (f) the dependency among the leaders "on assistance and advices" from foreign "experts" for solution to problems.

The Marcos Period (1966-1986)

The story of Ferdinand E. Marcos' reign can be gleaned from works of Lichauco in Jose (1982); Agoncillo and Guerrero (1986); Schirmer and Shalom (1987); Zaide (1996); and Tiglao (1998).

Ferdinand Marcos became president in 1965. He remained in power for 20 years and crafted a kind of Sultanism that sowed the seeds of struggle for national freedom and democracy.

In 1972, his administration institutionalized a foreign investment-led economy following the free trade of the IMF. Instead of helping the economy, the policy allowed foreign investors to suck our country dry. Marcos himself understood the predicament and announced in 1969:

"The profit remittances of local subsidiaries of foreign corporations are among the invisibles that tend to increase the size of our current deficits. They amount to about $120 million to $150 million annually. Since they enjoy the hospitality of our country and profit from our markets, it would be proper for them to help relieve some of our balance of payments pressure by reinvesting their profits abroad [meaning in the Philippines].."
(Lichauco in Jose 1982:39)

The national economy slumped because the it can no longer be fixed from its existing condition, abetted no less by the quality of leadership which did not respond to needs of the time.

Marcos understood the root of the economic problem but he chose to focus on his plan to hold on to power. Before he became president, for example, Marcos criticized the dispatch of a Military Engineering Batallion to Vietnam as proposed by Macapagal.

When he became president, his views reversed and sent Filipino troupes to Vietnam. Communism had intensified and became the cause of tensions outside and inside the nation.

The Philippines became host to the internal meetings of the US and its allies on October 25, 1966 to strengthen a coalition against socialist countries. The nation protested against the aggravating situation. Progressive organizations were established that brought insurrectionary movements to life again.

Nemesis of the traditional political system were born: the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the New People's Army (NPA). In major towns and cities the workers and the students were active in protest movements. But amid the worsening condition, all the state could think of was to effect constitutional change. Jobs and justice were the needs of the Filipino masses. But the state responded with politics and oppressive laws.

After the declaration of Martial Law in Sept. 21, 1972 the American Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines sent a telegram:

"The American Chamber of Commerce wishes you every success in your endeavor to restore peace and order, business confidence and economic growth and the well-being of the Filipino people and the nation. We assure you of our confidence and cooperation in achieving these objectives. We are communicating these feelings to our associate and affiliates in the United States."
(Schirmer and Shalom 1987:229-230)

When he first sat in office, the Filipinos believed the promises of Ferdinand Marcos. He promised the realization of a genuine land reform, improvement of the ordinary people's lives, not sending Filipino soldiers to Vietnam, and others. Not

long after, the nation realized that the Marcos administration was no different from previous administrations, especially in its ties with the US. Despite massive protests Marcos, won a second term as President of the nation making him the only president to be elected twice in the country.

Money and intimidation were the prime movers in 1969, said to be among the dirtiest electoral exercises that took place in the country. Marcos' electoral victory in 1979, triggered massive protest because of the continued disregard to the poor situation of Philippine society. There were widespread protest against government's insincerity in implementing reforms, rampant criminality and extreme poverty. The chasm between rich and poor widened.

The immediate result of the Martial Law was the incarceration of many of Marcos' adversaries and activists. The persecution of dissenters were intensified in the guise of anti-criminality campaigns. Private armies were dismantled and unlicensed firearms were confiscated. Curfew hours were set between midnight and four in the morning. The government, was effective in these aspects for a few months, as chaos and criminality gradually went down.

A broad spectrum of protests gradually unmasked Marcos' intent to sustain himself in power. Marcos suspended congress and wrested the powers to make laws, which he proclaimed by way of presidential decrees and letters of instructions, and other issuances. Marcos did this as part of his legitimation schemes.

During Martial Law, *General Order No. 2* was issued by the Secretary of National Defense. This instructed the military to jail all dissenters and oppositionists involved with insurrectionary or rebellion groups (Agoncillo and Guerrero 1986:585).

In the name of "national interest" lawmakers who opposed the Marcos dictatorship were arrested. They were Benigno Aquino, Jr., Jose W. Diokno, Jovito Salongga, to name a few. Even students and teachers, school employees and entrepreneurs critical of the government were jailed without legal charges.

Through *Letter of Instruction No. 1*, the printing press, radio, newspapers, and television channels were all shut down. The people were moving blindly on the situation of the country. Along this was the loss of freedom of expression and the freedom to organize and freely assemble.

VII. Developmentalism Under a Dictatorship

Reform politics here is drawn from the orientation of developmental states that are tied up to the greater debate on state formation. Here, state structures were considered products of the unusual concentrations of power and coercive ability rather than being a direct response to the functional demands of a development strategy.

In the regime, pursuant to *Presidential Decree No. 6*, the bureaucracy was reorganized. The edict laid down the grounds for penalties for those who did not deserve public office. The slogan "*Sa ikauunlad ng bayan, disiplina ang kailangan*" (for the country to progress, discipline is needed) was widely popularized to prop up its vision of "*Bagong Lipunan*" (New Society). As a way to save the government from the enemies of the state, he ordered for the dismissal of the 10% of 60,000 of government employees.

Posturing to promote assets reform and assets redistribution, Marcos issued *Presidential Decree No. 27*. It placed the whole country under a land reform program where every farmer was given a chance to acquire three hectares of land with natural water sources or five if land had no natural water sources available.

The coverage of the program was limited only to rice and corn fields. But long before it took off, the program was already seen as ill-fated.

Landowners refused to redistribute of their properties to the farmers. Landowners stopped lending to peasants money to fund their fertilizer inputs, pesticides and even the seedlings, and curtailed water supply.

Masagana 99 was then implemented to support farm credits for pesticide, fertilizers and seedling inputs. However, technological advancement in agriculture and food production remained very low and backward. Next to this is a new face of exploitation at the rural communities:

> "There was a shift from the extraction of landlord rent on the basis of landownership; profits by traders who sold the fertilizers and pesticides assumed a major role in the extraction of surplus value. Even small landowning peasants were drawn into the orbit of commercial exploitation owing to the increasing requirements for inputs…Having little capital, they fell prey to new and more inequitable sharing arrangements with landlords or with traders. Worse, with the increase of capital costs many of the small farmers had to sell off their lands and joined the growing mass of property-less wage-workers in the countryside." (Tiglao 1998:36-37)

Classic literature on Filipino experience of dictatorship is found in the 1973 Constitution. Marcos legitimized his Sultanistic regime with the establishment of the *Bagong Lipunan Constitution* or New Society Constitution.

This was another step to sustain his power in office. His term was to end in 1973 so he called for a Constitutional Convention (CONCON) in September 25, 1972 to draft a constitution. The document was presented to a so-called *Citizen's Assembly*, which ratified the new constitution.

In a series of a manipulated referendum, Marcos was able to consolidate his political power. Through *Proclamation No. 1102* the New Constitution was promulgated in 1973. The following were the results after the ratification of the constitution (Agoncillo and Guerrero 1986: 587-588): (a) official abolition of the legislature; (b) unification of the position of president and prime minister in the person of Ferdinand Marcos alone; (c) the change of government from presidential to parliamentary; and (d) the president was mandated to call for an interim assembly.

Under his "constitutional authoritarianism," the power was concentrated in the hands of the Marcoses whose family and cronies became prime beneficiaries of his regime. Marcos was the president, his wife Imelda was governor of the whole of Manila and secretary of the Ministry of Human Settlements. Daughter Imee Marcos was national president of the Kabataang Barangay and lawmaker at the Batasang Pambansa. Marcos' sister Elizabeth became governor of Ilokos, while Benjamin Kokoy Rumualdez, favorite brother of Imelda became governor of Leyte, Ambassador to the US, and a lawmaker in the Batasang Pambansa among the posts. Thus, "conjugal dictatorship" and the Marcos and Rumualdez dynasties were started. (Mijares 1976)

Along with the New Constitution were the presence of the US military bases and the army on the watch to protect their interests. Presidential Guard Batallion (PGB), the Intelligence Service of the AFP (ISAFP), and the National Intelligence Service Authority (NISA), were there to strictly monitor government employees, political detainees, workers' and the students' movements.

These intelligence units were involved in tortures and summary executions that disregard human dignity of activists and individuals affiliated with the left. The military forces used the anti-communist campaign to justify their massive human rights violations, committed in the form of tortures, warrantless arrests, salvaging, detentions without cases filed in court, and forced disappearances. Amnesty International reported:

> The mission found convincing evidence that the employment of torture was widespread. Of 107 prisoners interviewed, 71 informed the delegates that they had been tortured. The conclusion is unavoidable that torture of prisoners was part of the general approach to the treatment of suspects. This had the effects of intimidating all those arrested on suspicion of having committed political offenses. None of the prisoners interviewed had been convicted, although trial proceedings have begun for some of them." (Schirmer and Shalom 1987: 188)

The Marcos dictatorship continued to exploit the situation together with the US. From the mountainous areas of Northern Luzon, to the Central plains of Luzon, the Visayan Islands, and in the forests of Mindanao, all the nation had but one cry– "Down with the Marcos Regime!" Many organizations lost their strengths and finally died. Only the Muslim separatists and the underground leftist movement had held their ground to pursue their armed resistance.

Massive literature also provides ample account on the gradual rise of militancy among dissenters seeking to topple down the Marcos regime and seeking for reforms. Many joined the movements that combat structural repression.

One of these movements was the *Katipunan ng mga Demokratikong Sosyalistang Pilipino* (KDSP) of 1971— a moderate left organization. At first KDSP believed that the armed component is not an absolute necessity to achieve its objective. Ed Jopson was an example. The armed movement of the CPP-NPA and the expulsion of those disillusioned members of the KDSP resolved and pursued an ideology and strategy that worked.

In 1976, the SANDIGAN built an armed component with strong faith and standpoint that convinced opposition leaders like Senator Francisco Rodrigo and Jovito Salonga. It was declared illegal in 1978. But in the 1980s, the group was able to sustain its influence and used guerrilla warfare to weaken the government of the dictatorship in the countryside.

As a result, the government was in a quandary as to where and what it should tackle first, the countryside where the CPP-NPA-NDF had set their camps, the cities which served as base of the KDSP, or Mindanao where the Moro National Liberation Movement– Bangsa Moro Army (MNLF-BMA) sowed terror.

Reform politics in the country hints an influence from the left. For instance, the local literature on anti-bureaucratism starts with understanding about the existence of the three basic problems of Philippine society coined out by the Marxist left: (a) bureaucrat capitalism; (b) feudalism; and (c) imperialism.

The left describes Philippine society as semi-colonial and semi-feudal state (Guerrero [1979]2005). This is because US monopoly capitalism, subordinated and impinges on the feudal mode of production of the Philippines. America uses violence and deception and manages to impose itself on the Filipino people. The US had duped the Philippine oligarchy into believing that it will save them from Spanish colonialism, as it employed counterrevolutionary tactics for a war of aggression, and has held the Philippines under its direct control as a neo-colony up to the present time.

At the end of the day, people come to realize that historically symptomatic of the backward economic condition of dependent states, the Philippine government became tied up to foreign debts at the following rate of accumulation and norms of debt servicing, from the Marcos administration to Arroyo's regime:

Figure No. 2: Philippine Foreign Debt Experience ("Philippine Debt, Starlight Express" by D. Acap, S. Chiong, K. Puentevella and E. Velasco)

US$ million	Marcos 1966-85	Aquino 1986-91	Ramos 1992-97	Estrada 1998-00	Arroyo 2001-06
Foreign debt at end of period	26,389	29,933	42,972	51,206	53,367
Accumulation during entire term	25,790	3,544	13,039	8,234	2,161
Average annual accumulation	1,290	591	2,173	2,745	360
Memo items:					
Public foreign debt at end of period	19,259	24,550	26,708	34,135	37,076
Accumulation during entire term	-	5,291	2,158	7,427	2,941
Average annual accumulation	-	882	360	2,476	490
Private foreign debt at end of period	7,130	5,382	16,263	17,070	16,291
Accumulation during entire term	-	(1,748)	10,881	807	(779)
Average annual accumulation	-	(291)	1,814	269	(130)

Figure No. 3: Philippine Debt Servicing Norm
("Philippine Debt, Starlight Express" by D. Acap, S. Chiong, K. Puentevella and E. Velasco)

	Marcos	Aquino	Ramos	Estrada	Arroyo
	1981-85	1986-91	1992-97	1998-00	2001-05
Debt service burden (US$ million)	13,661	17,774	27,465	17,893	47,642
Average annual DSB (US$ million)	2,732	2,962	4,578	5,964	9,568
Average annual per capita (US$)	52.80	50.17	67.67	79.33	117.00
Average annual DSB to GDP (%)	8.1	7.8	6.9	8.2	11.8

'Almost 1/3 or more of the national budget goes to interest payments on national debts owing a lot of money from creditors. The debt continues to snowball. It never significantly decrease at all with the last Aquino administration leaving with an outstanding $ 65 Billion of loans. The proof of the pudding is that the money saved for debt service balloons every year. The Philippine government borrows to pay the money that it borrowed and this has been a practice for many years. To keep government afloat and service its debt, it resorts to borrowing from foreign and local creditors.' [i]

VIII. Post-EDSA Reform politics

Post-EDSA literature is developed foremost in Benedict Anderson's *Cacique Democracy in the Philippines: Origins and Dreams* published in the *New Left Review* (1988:3-33). This period commenced with the melodramatic scene where Corazon Cojuangco Aquino returned to the Philippines, widower of Senator Binigno Aquino Sr., and administered the burial of her husband.

News stories and other documentary evidence show that the poignant scene generated an outpouring of sympathy from people from all walks of life for the widow of the fallen martyr. The yellow ribbon, black pins and the statement, "*Hindi ka nag-iisa*" ("You are not alone"), became a byword of sympathy for Senator Benigno Aquino, who was murdered upon return to the country.

Media institutions such as the Philippine Daily Inquirer, reported on formation of movements, coalitions—such as the Justice for All, Justice for Aquino (JAJA) movement, the August Twenty One Movement (ATOM), Citizens for Human Rights and Social Transformation (CHRIST), Citizens of Las Piñas for Aquino and Democracy (CLAD), Muslim Organization for Solidarity, Equality for the Masses (MOSLEM), United for President's Ouster (UPO), Kilusan para sa Kapangyarihan at Karapatan ng Bayan (KAAKBAY), Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN), the Bayang Nagkaisa sa Diwa at Layunin (BANDILA).

The dictator Marcos was besieged by massive national movements calling for his ouster. The Aquino murder was aggravated by the worsening economic condition, plus the series of military atrocities, such as the Escalante Massacre, the Bombing at Ipil in the Zamboanga peninsula, and others.

The people believed Marcos had lost his mandate to lead the country. To validate and legitimize his unpopular stay in power, he ordered the holding of a snap election. But traditional politicians joined the cause-oriented groups in their campaign to boycott any of Marcos' elections.

On February 7, 1986, a snap election was held. Many sectors moved and called for the widening of democratic space via elections. Suspicion were rife, that the Marcos administration was out to cheat in order to ensure his electoral victory. Some teachers reported that supervisors had asked them to choose Marcos in exchange for money.

The Social Security System (SSS) employees, in fact, had to work overtime to insert money into envelopes that bear a print "Office of the President." Barangay officials were also used to distribute these envelpes in exchange for votes for Marcos. And as expected, government personnel were used to mobilize in their dirty strategy. In a way, the CPP and the movement BAYAN were right in their projection that Marcos would not allow Cory to win the elections (Guerrero 2005; Constantino 1979).

Amid the waves of people's protests a group of young AFP personnel, who were disillusioned with the Marcos regime, organized themselves into a group called, "We Belong Movement" (WBM). The organization was formed in the wake of the demoralization of some AFP, members who realized that the AFP earned the notoriety of being Marcos' private army, favoured only generals who are close to Marcos allies. Moreover, the slow pace of promotion and the loss of credibility of the AFP hastened the formation of the military movements. Gaining strength the WBM later changed its name to what was later popularly known as the Reform the AFP Movement (RAM) that became so active in the 1986 elections (Anderson 1998).

The popular uprising that toppled the Marcos regime in 1986 is named after the place in Metro-Manila where people power was born. The middle class forces which dominated what is now known as the EDSA I uprising, the appeal to a democratic reform politics, and the adherence of a substantial number of the Filipino people to its anti-corruption agenda, is still considered the turning point in the emergence of reform politicians as legitimate, new-type politicians that deserve the respect and trust of the electorate.

While the first EDSA uprising was going on, the elite was busy finding means to consolidate its control over political power. On the other hand, it could have been a chance for the national democratic movement to find its way this time in the mainstream political arena. However, it had chosen to boycott the elections leaving itself to the cold. Some people disregarded the movement and made their own way to the positions of power too.

As a result, a section of the elite, wrested control of the government. They were the ones that Marcos had

disenfranchised during his dictatorship. They were able to regain their stake holdings and other assets went back to big old business, disregarding the left and its role in previous collective efforts in coalitions. Classic examples are the properties of the Lopez', such as the ABS-CBN and MERALCO. Years later, the Marcos' circles and even the members of Marcos' family were back to office.

The discourse on 'people power' or EDSA I shows how this new-type politicians, most of whom were tempered in the struggle against the Marcos dictatorship, had acquired some level of ascendancy in Philippine politics. Despite their broad-based appeal, the political ascendancy of reform politicians did not result in massive political and structural change in the era.

As an event that triggered political settlements, EDSA I, might have expanded the space for participation by politicians of non-traditional types and stripes. However, most of the renowned political icons of the era also came from the same trapo families who were disadvantaged by the Marcos dictatorship. In many ways, these politicians were able to regain their political ascendancy under the administration of President Corazon Aquino after EDSA I.

The much wider democratic space in the realm of political participation during this period was characterized by ambiguity and inconsistency. While it spoke of reforms and ideals of political change, the Cory Aquino government did not hide its ambivalence on crucial social justice issues such as agrarian reform, particularly in the contested lands of the Cojuangco-Aquino owned Hacienda Luisita sugar estate.

The succeeding post-EDSA administrations, with the political elites still at the helm, allowed the US bases to pack up from the Clark airfield and the Subic naval-base. This is evidenced by the fact that the State sustained the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) of 1951 and accommodated the entry of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) in 1997.

PCJJ's comprehensive work on corruption in the Philippines with contributors/authors such as Isagani de Castro (1998), Shiela Coronel (1998), Earl Parreño (1998), and Ellen Tordesillas (1998) maps out where national politics is skewed. PCJJ's work, says using public money for political campaigns was en vogue in the Marcos regime but it was not stopped despite stringent measures after 1986 (Isagani de Castro 1998).

Congress controls millions of money for "pork barrel" funds that only ended up in projects that have not impacted on the lives of the poor (Parreño 1998). Government was also involved in dubious deals like the famous Amari Land Scam (Tordesillas and Coronel 1998), or business monopoly (Coronel 1998:112-149).

The only consolation during this period was President Cory Aquino's wider consultative form of engagement that she provided for other social classes to participate in. Political settlement here was seen in the Cory government's accommodation of retired military generals in public office, and the growing number of petty entrepreneurial classes, entertainment industry personalities, media personalities, and a number of moderate social activists at the helm of government service.

The Ramos administration that ensued, towed the same line as the Cory Aquino's developmentalist agenda in his NICHOOD Philippines 2000. However, the same cultivates on the assembly line in a Fordist international industrialization, such as the case of Cebu's Western Seaboard's ship building and ship breaking industries, that sacrificed basic sectors in coastal communities of Western Cebu province, Toledo City, Balamban, Asturias towns (Sanchez 2005; Sanchez 1997).

Estrada sustained the same in his "*Angat Pinoy*" agenda but only to expand our foreign debts. This was followed by Arroyo's "*Super Regions*" in the "T*he Arrangkada Philippines Project*" under the auspices of the American Chamber of Commerce (AMCHAM) that pushed for 471 policy recommendations. And the latest is the Aquino Regime's "Inclusive Growth" with the Joint Foreign Chambers of Commerce (JFCC) signing up the Transpacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA) hoping to boost the economy via tourism and a more neo-liberal economic framework of development in the country.

Contemporary regimes, however, sustain the same aggressiveness in pushing for neo-liberal developmentalism or that foreign investments led economy, despite informed threats and the experience of economic down turn in the Marcos regime.

Syncretic forms of Political Institutions

On the other hand, EDSA 1 is considered the pivotal force in the emergence of reform politicians as new-type politicians in the country. These new-type politicians may have gained some level of ascendancy in Philippine politics but their political ascendancy is not of a kind that effects massive political and structural change in the era. As an event that triggered political settlements, EDSA I might have expanded the space for political participation by politicians of non-traditional types and stripes. But there were also some trapo families, who lost their powerful political positions in the Marcos dictatorship, were able to regain their political ascendancy under the administration of President Corazon Aquino after EDSA I.

The much wider democratic space in the realm of political participation during this period was characterized by ambiguity and inconsistency. While it spoke of reforms and ideals of political change, the Cory administration did not hide the ambivalent position on matters of genuine assets redistribution, particularly in the contested lands such as that of Hacienda Luisita. In some instances, however, it was said to have dampened the feudal practices of the landed oligarchs what with the introduction of new programs for land and agrarian reform. The succeeding post-EDSA administrations, with the Janus-faced political elites still at the helm, allowed the US bases to pack up from the Clark airfield and the Subic naval-base, but at the same time it showed unqualified acceptance of American intervention in the political affairs of the state. This is evidenced by the fact that the State sustained the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) of 1951 and accommodated the entry of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) in 1997.

Using public money for political campaigns was en vogue in the Marcos regime but it was not stopped despite

stringent measures after 1986 (Isagani de Castro 1998). Congress controls millions of money for "pork barrel" funds that only ended up in projects that have not impacted on the lives of the poor (Parreňo, Earl 1998). Government was also involved in dubious deals like the famous Amari Land Scam (Tordesillas and Coronel 1998), or business monopoly (Coronel 1998: 112-149). The only consolation during this period was President Cory Aquino's wider consultative form of engagement that she provided for other social classes to participate in. Political settlement here was seen in the Cory government's accommodation of retired military generals in public office, and the growing number of petty entrepreneurial classes, entertainment industry personalities, media personalities, and a number of moderate social activists at the helm of government service.

In retrospect democratic transition can also be revisited from historical perspective in the "Limang Kapanahunan ng Pamumunong Bayan sa Kasaysayan ng Pilipinas" by historian Zeus Salazar (1997) that shows that transformation of leadership categories was due to the mixing and interchange of native categories with foreign and colonial categories from the time of Spanish intervention until after the time of the Katipunan revolution of 1896. Salazar (1997) argues that strands of old colonial politics overlap with the emerging new native politics with its distinctive reoriented tasks and functions, and new leadership ideologies. Furthermore, it shows how the emerging native politics accommodate resistance oriented leaders of the former anti-Marcos movements within the same social field of politics.

Salazar's (1997) periodization and categorization of sources of leadership and orientation suggest a kind of heuristic framework for understanding the political development of the Philippines according to the following premises: a.) Mga uri o kategoriya ng pamumuno (Types and categories of leadership); b.) Gawain o tungkulin ng pamumuno (Tasks and obligations of leaders); c.) Pinagmumulan o pinaghahanguan ng pamumuno (Origins and sources of leadership); d.) Mga katangian ng pamumuno (Characteristics of leadership); e.) Ideolohiya o sumasaklaw at pinaiiral na kaisipan o tunguhin ng pamunuan (Ideology or overarching principles and approaches of leadership); f.) Wika at samakatuwid kultura ng pamumuno (Spoken language or the delineated leadership culture); and g.) Pagkakaroon at kawalan ng kasarinlan o maipagmamalaking kakanyahan ng pamunuan (Notion of what could advance a sovereignty and/or what could lead to the loss of one's sovereignty and/or credibility as a leader.)

Salazar also establishes proofs of the evolution of the native Filipino political structure and culture according to the framework: a.) Saligang institusyon sa pag-umpisa (Basic political institutions such as the four pillars of leadership in the country: of the Datu, Babaylan, Panday and Bagani); b.) Pagkahubog (Formation); and c.) Pagkabuo ng lipunan at Pulitikang Pilipino (The Formation of Philippine Society and Politics.)

His periodization of the historical development of Filipino politics and culture is premised on the following: a.) Dating pamumuno (bago 1565) (Old political leadership prior to 1565); b.) Pamumunong Pinoy sa panahong kolonyal (1565-1815) (Filipino leadership in Colonial Times, 1565-1815); c.) Pamumunong Pinoy bago ang rebelyon, (1815-1896) (Filipino leadership prior to the rebellion, 1815-1896); d.) Panahon ng Rebelyon (1896-1913) (Leadership during the rebellion, 1896-1913); e.) Kasalukuyan (1913-1996) (Contemporary period, 1913 -1996).

Hence, it is observed that not all transitions from one period of administration to another always coincide with the opposite direction such as a realignment from feudal absolutist institutions to that of a democratic and commercial economic institutions. In fact the Latin American feudal and agricultural institutions transformed into *caudilla*, populist and neo-colonized states in the case of most Latin America. Perhaps, from Salazar's (1997) work, one can theorize further what better framework could be used to understand the processes of transition in the Philippines from some kind of sultanistic administration in both national and sub-national levels such as that starting from a Marcosian era to the more recent ones in Philippine political history. Meanwhile, looking back to Sidel's patrimonialism, one can find resonance in Linz and Stepan's (1996) sultanistic regimes where all individuals, groups and institutions are permanent subjects to unpredictable and despotic interventions of an authority they call sultanistic. In sultanism all pluralisms are considered precarious where traditional domination by means of military force is used as instrument for dictatorship. However, in the Philippines, the years following the first EDSA revolution were also the years when paramilitary groups were effectively used as state apparatus to stifle democratic dissent in the guise of preserving internal security and "peace" keeping. In fact, the existence of the Citizens Armed Force Geographical Unit (CAFGU) has been sustained all over the country from its inception to the present.

Classic Case of Reform-Type Political Settlement: Robredo Style

Political settlement may also appear in such norm as one that balances social interests of various political groups or entities that are non-patrimonial but service-oriented alternative structures of formal and semi-formal networks. These are proven to be effective political settlement organizations as shown in Kawanaka's (1996) work on the "Robredo" leadership style. From being an ordinary worker in San Miguel Corporation (SMC), Robredo left his corporate job to pursue the Bicol River Basin Development Program (BRBDP) (Isaac and Aceron, 2007 pp. 7-47 in Medel-Lopez Gonzalez, 2007). He first became famous for the success of this project. As alternative political institution, Robredo's alternative organizations were remarkable for being egalitarian, rather than feudal, in character. Rather than promoting patron-client relationships, the political machine and bossism of old, these groups replicated mass organizations functioning as democratic political structures for that encouraged extensive people's participation in governance.

His exposure to the private organizations under the BRBDP hugely contributed to his stint as an exemplary public servant. His output oriented-NGO technocracy, combined with

his corporate skills, blended into his management style in the Naga City LGU. His expertise enabled him to realign various sectors on board, realizing development programs in the city via people-oriented development direction. He was later recognized for initiating the following projects while in public office: a.) Mass housing for poor informal settlers in Naga City; b.) "improved basic social services for the city"; c.) anti graft and corrupt practices campaign activities; d.) drawing thousands of constituents to participate in his regular conduct of civic action series with the different sectors of the community; e.) formation of city councils and accreditation of POs and NGOs as partners in governance; f.) giving emphasis to the poor as a priority in his "Kaantabay sa Kauswagan Program" (Partners in Development Program); g.) Raising the level of performance, productivity and morale among city employees; h.) initiating strike movements against patronage politics in Naga City (Pabico 2007; Legazpi 2005: 35-52; Isaac and Aceron 2007: 7-47).

An effective type of political settlement is seen in Robredo's participatory LGU management mechanisms as shown by the following: a.) the unity of the constituents of Naga City who support his governance and the LGU's support for the constituents through social services; b.) His participatory governance that was open to the involvement of all stakeholders in the tasks of city hall; c.) the importance of mutual trust; d.) the effectivity of decentralized governance coupled with regularity and seriousness of performance reviews and feedback mechanisms among employees; and e.) the effectivity of "empowerment ordinances that authorize citizens to become involved in the city policy formulation, where constituents are entitled to participate in welfare organizations and city hall committee meetings" (Legazpi 2005: 34-52; Isaac and Aceron 2007: 7-47.)

Ironically, however, the overwhelming popular support for Robredo's leadership and management at one time had virtually reduced the democratic political structure of Naga City to a one party system. As no one dared to run against Robredo, whose popularity and political leadership in Naga City was unmatched by any politicians, his political party stood unbeatable in the elections during his stint as mayor in the city. In an interview with the researcher, Mayor Robredo revealed that in the last three elections prior to his stint as DILG secretary, he was unopposed in the local elections.

When he died as Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments (DILG), Robredo was extolled for his *"Tsinelas Brand of Leadership"*. People grieved over his death. He died leaving a legacy of excellence in public service and his "management by example" for people to remember him by. He was admired for reporting to office early in the day with his casual workman's clothes to put other employees and the public at ease before him, and for his pursuance of a merit-based hiring and promotion system in public office.

In Statist framework, Kawanaka, Takeshi (2002) *Power in a Philippine City*, Tokyo: Institute of Developing Studies, looks at Robredo's case by asking the following sets of questions: How do local political leaders who emphasize good governance manage to maintain local power? How do local political leaders affect the formation of important political institutions? How have periodic changes in central-local relations affected the nature of local power, and why have these changes occurred? Do good governance initiatives affect the salience of the political machine? How similar would the findings be if the theoretical framework is applied in a more rural setting?

Distinctive from other studies, Kawanaka, focused on the case of Mayor Jesse Robredo of Naga City who is a reform politician, unlike previous studies in examining how state shapes local politics, utilized case studies of local "strongmen", "warlords" and "bosses" and focused on the use of illegal economic activities and political violence as mechanism for maintaining local power and control.

The study accounts here how Robredo appropriated his political machine to good use in the manner he conducts public office emphasizing the redistributive welfare capacity of the LGU as a state institution. Significantly, Kawanaka in this work explains the parallel existence of good governance and political machines in local politics and provokes questions that are important to understanding Philippine local politics.

As opposed to the sociocultural framework, that identifies kinship patterns, social relationships and traditional values that reinforce the patron-client system, as crucial in explaining the nature of local politics, Kawanaka uses statism as his framework of analysis, by looking at the two important realities neglected by the socio-cultural perspectives, which are: a.) competition among political leaders in gaining access to the state's resources, and b.) the role of institutions that define how the state's resources are allocated.

This statist framing sought to present an alternative explanation of how local power is obtained and maintained. In the objectives of Kawanaka's study, he articulated that he sought "*to present a different type of local politician from that of the warlord type, and to refute the image of Philippine local politics as filled with violence and illegal activities*" (p. 19).

Kawanaka found out that monopoly on the control of state resources and the effective distribution of these resources are the important factors in maintaining local power, rather than cultural values, patron client relationship and personal wealth, as argued by the sociocultural perspective. It asserts that the socioeconomic condition in a locality is an important contextual variable, since the manner in which state resources are channelled to meet the interests of local citizens differ across the landscape and across socioeconomic classes.

Likewise, Kawanaka established that the reasons for competing in public office, are as follows: a.) because state office provides access to resources such as finance, credit allocation, regulatory power, employment in the public sector, physical coercive power through the police, and b.) because being a part of a state institution enables access to state resources which maybe allocated and utilized, such as the electoral system, the framework of central-local relations, and the spoils system in civil service appointments

Significantly, Kawanaka's work proved a hybridized appropriation of machine politics, where political machines does not result in the systematic plunder of state resources as

other studies have depicted Philippine politics as characteristic of a "predatory state". Hence, in the case of Naga City where the urban poor are concerned about assets redistribution (through housing, livelihood, and other such programmes), it was also found out that other social classes, such as the middle class continues to support Robredo because his good service results in the delivery of important assets such as development infrastructures. In Kawanaka, these are considered as both divisible and indivisible benefits reallocated for the everyday life of the constituency.

Here, literature would point to the practice of reform politics based on participatory governance mixed with a norm of communalism of old, a practice that resonated from the native notion of "pamiminunong pampamayanan" rather than that of the colonially oriented rational-legal bureaucracy. What makes the Robredo leadership style a novelty was the way he led or managed a city with deep respect and his collegiality with poor folks in his LGU, unlike other city mayors who would rather be insulated from the rest of the people. This shows us that in order for good governance to work and to succeed, a mixture of old communal norm is needed in the practice of leadership and development in a city.

Literature on local reform politics, however, provides the researcher a dearth of data based on the minimal incidence of the emergence of reform politicians in the field. Much of these experiences are merely based on development reports of fragmented initiatives from different individuals, sectors and institutions. Consolidation of these observations into a body of scientific literature is yet to be established to make for a consistent body of knowledge.

The Party List System

A new-type political norm also comes with the entry of the party list system (PLS) in Philippine politics, introducing such changes in political practice as proportional representation through voting of parties or of voting based on program platforms rather than personalities. These modes of representative politics are provided in the policy declaration of Republic Act (RA) 7941 or the Party List System (PLS) Act that says:

> The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations, or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives.

Somewhat analogous to the Tzarist accommodation of the Duma in the history of Russian authoritarianism, sectoral representation was first introduced to the Philippines during the Marcos dictatorship through the institutionalization of the corporatist system. In this system, every sector was to be represented by organization approved and controlled by Marcos himself (KASARINLAN, August 10, 2004, PROCEEDINGS, Policy Dialogue Series 2004: Academe Meets the Party-List Representatives p. 5-18). Unfortunately, however, it turned out that most, if not all of sectoral representatives at the time, were either labor bureaucrats from the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (TUCP), fake peasants, or individuals who had never had any recognizable relationships to sectors they were supposed to represent (Ibid.).

In the Party List law there were similar progressive provisions that include a.) the granting of absentee voting rights to Filipino citizens abroad (Article V, Sec. 2); b.) the election of sectoral representatives (Artcile X, Sec. 9); and c.) the prohibition of political dynasties (Article II, Sec. 26). These were resolutions made in EDSA 1 in 1986 that were incorporated in the Philippine Constitution as part of the move toward the democratization of Philippine society (Ibid.). These provisions offer hope for transformation of the trapo system via the more programatic parties that are more responsive to needs of the marginalized majority of Filipinos. The party list system is envisioned to respond to calls for genuine representation for marginalized masses in the legislature. The partylist system calls for proportional representation through the party list ballot while it focuses attention on the party and not on personalities, thus rendering the names of candidates meaningless and thereby reducing money politics (Wurfel 1997).

Parallel to the party list system is the practice electing or appointing local leaders who became LGU officials on the bases of their historically active participation in people's organizations that were radically pursuing issues affecting poor and marginalized sectors.

IX. Conclusion

This part of the survey of literature helps establish patterns of roles of Filipino strong institutions, and the social foundations of their growth by answering the question, where these institutions and social relations came from in the first place. Also the role of more distal sources versus proximate causes (in historical context); questions of sequencing and path dependence; and issues of case selection and causal inferences were scrutinized to draw on how reform politics had situated itself over the course of time.

Nation building in Philippine context, resonates from the long and extensive history of resistance against colonial to a neo-colonial political order.

Turning points for reforms commenced with the concepts of the formation of a Filipino nation that took off from a series of nativistic revolts as the immediate form of resistance against Spanish foreign intrusion. Nativism is resistance against the new order as it pushes forth a need to return to the native life-world. But with the kind of colonial brutalities committed by Spain against the Filipino natives in ancient times, who would not think to stand and fight back to preserve one's race?

Statistics has it that not less than two uprisings happened in a year and that more than 25 uprisings had taken

place prior to 1745. In 1745 up to the 19th century, the series of resistance took the shape of fighting for assets reforms, assets redistribution and on top of everything it calls for national freedoms.

A series of democratic transitions has been scattered all over Philippine political history since colonial times. This is evidenced by a legacy of a series of uprisings in the early movements for change.

Among the forms of resistance that serve as revolutionary tradition of the Filipino people are popular uprisings. Popular uprisings were common themes that characterize the Filipino resistance movement in both Spanish and American colonial times.

The popular uprisings were later followed by the Catholic Church's secularization movement pushing for native clergy to handle parishes as a rightful trajectory rooted from the original Episcopal missions. However, three Filipino priests, the Fathers Mariano Gomez, Jose Burgos and Jacinto Zamora were executed in February 17, 1872 for charges of rebellion as they were implicated to the Cavite mutiny. The martyrdom of thepriests inspired the reform and propaganda movement that called for representation in the Spanish cortes, freedom of the press and a massive anti-friar sentiment. As it escalated, the more aggressive call for severing of ties with Spain peaked with nationalist Katipunan Revolution.

The historical controversy on how the Filipino revolutionary leaders were duped to have to wait for another independence day to be granted by another colonial power, sustains our nation-building efforts into another level of struggles demanding a more sturdy foundation for nation-building.

For this time, we have to face the problems of a neo-colonial order. After the Japanese war in 1946, a third republic was inaugurated and various economic and foreign policies were engaged from Roxas, Quirino, Magsaysay, Garcia, Macapagal to the Marcos dictatorship, now shaping what could be the basis of Philippine political structure and culture and that of the emergence of reform politics.

However, early on, what is in place is said to be a preponderance of political families in dyadic factions. These political families regularly come from among the wealthy and rich residents of the community. Hence, the household is attached to a system of patronage where politics thrive via systems of protection and support in feudal schemes where favors are exchanged for votes and political support.

These are true to families that breed the *Principalia* class of land-owning and prominent clan. It is also the same class that breeds the politically influential Ilustrado or native educated elite class.

Salazar (1997) sums up the transitions from a historical perspective, where significant political transformation occurred through the mix and interchange of native leadership categories with that of foreign and colonial categories from Spanish times to the more contemporary period.

Salazar (1997) argues that old politics overlap with new emerging politics in distinctive reoriented tasks and functions, and new ideologies of leadership. He posits that emerging native politics has a mix of orientation from the resistance movement of Spanish times; the pre-war (Japanese-American); post-war; and after Marcos period.

Anderson elaborated on cacique democracy that is a result of the institutionalization of the rule of law, "elections," political parties and factions. Along with this is also the politics of turn-coats and deserters, where there are no permanent allies and permanent enemies.

The major sources of reform politics was traced to the historical unfolding of political leadership and their handling of US interventions, right after WWII or the Third Philippine Republic, from the term of President Roxas, Quirino, Magsaysay, Garcia, Macapagal and the dictatorship of President Marcos.

The major influences that has affected the administration of the state include among others US economic and military policies such as the Bell Trade Act, The Laurel Langley Agreement, the US-Military Bases Agreement, the Mutual Defense Treaty, and the Martial Law.

The rise of a dictator in Philippine political history introduced such literature as the abolition of the legislative body and constitutional authoritarianism, making the position of the president one with that of a prime minister, and where the presidential form of government was transformed into a parliamentary one.

Summary executions, torture, disappearance and other massive forms of human rights violations became part of the experience. Various forms of organizations, from people's organizations (POs), alliances, coalitions and many others were used as channels of protests against the abusive conditions under a dictatorship.

In more recent development, the case of the leadership style of former DILG Secretary Jesse Robredo was considered a reform ideal type of politician. He realized development for the poor sectors in the city where they come from. He exemplified LGU management through his inclusive political settlements with poor sectors in the LGU where he served for the longest period in his political life.

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